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Abstract
We present a decision theoretic framework in which agents are learning
about market behavior and that provides microfoundations for models
of adaptive learning. Agents are internally rational, i.e., maximize dis-
counted expected utility under uncertainty given dynamically consistent
subjective beliefs about the future, but agents may not be externally ra-
tional, i.e., may not know the true stochastic process for payo¤ relevant
variables beyond their control. This includes future market outcomes
and fundamentals. We apply this approach to a simple asset pricing
model and show that the equilibrium stock price is then determined
by investorsexpectations of the price and dividend in the next period,
rather than by expectations of the discounted sum of dividends. As
a result, learning about price behavior a¤ects market outcomes, while
learning about the discounted sum of dividends is irrelevant for equilib-
rium prices. Stock prices equal the discounted sum of dividends only
after making very strong assumptions about agentsmarket knowledge.
Keywords: learning, internal rationality, consumption based asset
pricing
JEL Class. No.: G12, G14, D83, D84
1 Motivation
The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) places enormous demands
on agentsknowledge about how the market works. For most models
it implies that agents know exactly what market outcome will be as-
sociated with any possible contingency that could arise in the future.1
This appears utterly unrealistic given that state contingent markets that
could provide agents with such detailed information often fail to exist.
The objective of this paper is to present a rigorous decision-theoretic
setup that allows to relax these strong informational assumptions about
how the market works and that is useful for modeling learning about
market behavior by agents. As we show, relaxing these informational
assumptions can have important implications for model behavior.
The basic idea is to separate the standard rationality requirements
embedded in the REH into an internal and an external rationality
component. Internal rationality requires that agents make fully optimal
decisions given a well dened system of subjective probability beliefs
about payo¤ relevant variables that are beyond their control or ex-
ternal, including prices. External rationality postulates that agents
subjective probability belief equals the objective probability density of
external variables as they emerge in equilibrium.
We propose to relax the external rationality assumption but to fully
maintain internal rationality in a model with well specied microfoun-
dations. This reects the basic conviction that internal rationality is
a good starting point for analyzing social interactions. As we show,
however, internal rationality is not su¢ cient to achieve external ratio-
nality. Specically, internally rational agents can not simply derive the
equilibrium distribution of market prices through a deductive reasoning
process. The REH is thus not a consequence of optimal behavior at
the individual level. Instead, to achieve external rationality one typi-
cally needs to endow internally rational agents with a lot of additional
information about the market.
While we propose to relax external rationality, we suggest at the
same time to consider small deviations from the external rationality as-
sumption that is embedded in the REH. Specically, we consider agents
who entertain subjective beliefs that are not exactly equal to the objec-
tive density of external variables but that will be close to the beliefs that
an agent would entertain under the REH. This amounts to relaxing the
prior beliefsthat agents are assumed to entertain under the REH and
to study the economic implications of such a relaxation.
Doing so requires changing the microfoundations of our standard
1Exceptions are models with private information, see section 7.
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models. Specically, it requires enlarging the probability space over
which agents condition their choices, and including all payo¤-relevant
external variables, i.e., all variables that agents take as given. This
includes (competitive) market prices. This departs from the standard
formulation in the literature where agentsprobability space is reduced
from the outset to contain only exogenous (or fundamental) variables
with prices being excluded from the probability space. In the standard
formulation this is possible because prices are assumed to be a function
of exogenous fundamentals, and the equilibrium pricing functions are
assumed to be known to agents.2 The standard procedure thus imposes a
singularity in the joint density over market prices and fundamentals, with
the singularity representing agentsexact knowledge about how prices
are linked to fundamentals. It also implies that market outcomes carry
only redundant information, so that agents do not need to condition on
prices to behave optimally.
Assuming the existence of a singularity in agentsjoint beliefs about
prices and fundamentals, however, appears to be in stark contrast with
what academic economists seem to know about the relation between
prices and the observed history of fundamentals in the real world. This
manifests itself in the fact that empirical economists often fail to agree
on a dominant explanation for market price behavior and entertain com-
peting models and explanations. In contrast to this, agents in REmodels
have reached an agreement on the correct model for the market price in
period zero already. The existing uncertainty by expert economists sug-
gests, however, to endow agents in our models with similar uncertainty
about how prices link with fundamentals.
We do so by allowing agents to entertain a non-degenerate joint den-
sity over future prices and dividends, so that optimizing agents naturally
need to condition decisions also on price realizations. Even though this
is a potentially small departure from RE beliefs, we show that the model
outcome can be quite di¤erent.
The literature on adaptive learning previously studied models in
which agents learn about how to forecast future market outcomes. This
literature, however, makes a number of ad-hoc assumptions about agents
behavior and learning mechanisms.3 As a result, the microfoundations
of adaptive learning models have not been carefully laid out, and it is
unclear to what extent agents in these models take rational decisions
given the information they are assumed to possess.4 This generates
2This assumption is also made in the literature on rational bubbles, e.g., Santos
and Woodford (1997).
3We discuss these in detail in section 2 below.
4For example, the adaptive learning literature appeals to anticipated utility max-
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controversy, specially in applications of models of learning to empirical
work or for policy analysis, as is the case in an increasing number of
contributions.5
Our approach can be used to provide microfoundations to models
of adaptive learning. Similar to Muth (1961), who showed how adap-
tive expectations can be compatible with the REH, we demonstrate how
ordinary least squares learning - a widely assumed learning rule in the
adaptive learning literature - arises as the optimal way to update con-
ditional expectations from a complete and dynamically consistent set of
probability beliefs within a specic model.
To illustrate our approach for relaxing external rationality, we present
a simple asset pricing model with risk-neutral investors. We include
heterogeneous agents and standard forms of market incompleteness to
insure that there exists a distinction between the agents own decision
problem, which we assume to be perfectly known, and market behavior,
which we assume to be known only imperfectly.
We rst show - perhaps surprisingly - that the equilibrium stock price
is then determined by a one-step ahead asset pricing equation. More
precisely, the equilibrium stock price equals the marginal investors dis-
counted expected sum of the total stock payo¤ (price plus dividend) in
the next period. This di¤ers from models with perfect market knowl-
edge, where the equilibrium price equals the discounted sum of future
dividends. Our one-step ahead equilibrium pricing equation implies dif-
ferent market outcomes because the marginal agents expectations of
tomorrows price need not be related to the agents expectations about
future dividends. Indeed, it can be optimal for the agent to pay a high
price today - even if the agent expects the discounted sum of dividends
to be low - as long as the agent expects to be able to sell the stock at
a higher price tomorrow.6 The agent may reasonably expect to be able
to do so if she holds the expectation that the marginal agent tomorrow
will hold more optimistic price and dividend expectations.
With imperfect market knowledge, beliefs about future prices thus
become a crucial element for determining todays stock price. As a
imization in the sense of Kreps (1998), which is well-known to be not dynamically
consistent.
5For example, Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010), Adam (2005), Chakraborty
and Evans (2008), Cogley and Sargent (2008), Eusepi and Preston (2010), Marcet
and Nicolini (2003), and Timmermann (1993, 1996) use adaptive learning models
to explain data; Evans and Honkapohja (2003a, 2003b, 2005), Molnar and Santoro
(2007), Orphanides and Williams (2006) and Sargent (1999) employ such models for
policy analysis.
6This is so because it is optimal to engage in speculative trading in the sense of
Harrison and Kreps (1978).
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result, revisions in price beliefs add to the volatility of stock prices.
Moreover, if agents hold the view that prices di¤er from the discounted
sum of dividends, then actual prices will do so, thereby supporting their
initial view. Nevertheless, agentsbeliefs will di¤er from the objective
probability distribution of prices. Yet, as we show, agents can not derive
the objective distribution of prices through a deductive reasoning process
if they just know about their own dividend beliefs. This is possible only
with additional information, for example, if the preferences and beliefs
of all agents are common knowledge.
Intuitively, the stock price ceases to be a discounted sum of dividends
because imperfect market knowledge (or alternatively lack of common
knowledge of agentspreferences and beliefs) leads to a failure of the law
of iterated expectations. Since the identity of the marginal agent that
actually prices the stock is changing with time and because agents enter-
tain heterogeneous beliefs, the equilibrium price is given by expectations
evaluated under di¤erent probability measures each period. As a result,
agents cannot iterate forward on the one-step ahead pricing equation.7
A standard way to relax the strong informational assumptions under-
lying RE has been the concept of Bayesian rational expectations equilib-
rium. This literature allows for imperfect information about the density
of exogenous variables (fundamentals) but it maintains the assumption of
perfect knowledge about the mapping from fundamentals to prices, thus
assumes the existence of a singularity in agentsbeliefs over prices and
dividends. Bayesian RE equilibria thus deal with uncertainty about fun-
damentals (dividends) and market outcomes (prices) in a rather asym-
metric way: while the process for fundamentals is imperfectly known,
the contingent process for prices is assumed to be known perfectly.
Studying Bayesian RE equilibria, Bray and Kreps (1987) argued that
it was unclear how much information agents need to possess about the
market for a Bayesian RE equilibrium to emerge.8 Section 4 of this paper
can be interpreted as addressing this issue. In the context of our asset
7This feature also emerged in Allen, Morris and Shin (2006), who study an asset
pricing model with imperfect common knowledge. In their setting, the one-step ahead
pricing equation emerges from the underlying two-period overlapping generations
framework and di¤erential information across generations is sustained by introducing
a noise trader assumption. Both features together imply that one cannot easily iterate
forward on the one-step ahead pricing equations. While Allen, Morris and Shin
maintain RE in a model with private information, we depart from RE (by assuming
imperfect market knowledge) but derive the one-step ahead pricing equation in a
setting with innitely lived investors. Preston (2005) also points out how imperfect
market knowledge prevents the law of iterated expectations from giving a discounted
sum formulation of a budget constraint.
8This point has been discussed more recently, for example, by Marimon (1997)
and Sargent (2008).
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pricing model, we show that a series of strong informational assumptions
provide optimizing agent with su¢ cient information to map the process
for dividends into a single price outcome. These assumptions endow
the agent with a tremendous amount of additional knowledge about the
market, over and above what can be derived from internal rationality
alone. Roughly speaking, the Bayesian RE equilibrium emerges if all
agents possess the same information as the theorist, i.e., agents need to
know all details about all other agents in the economy, including other
agentsprobability beliefs, discount factors and so on, and all this needs
to be common knowledge.
Considering agents whose beliefs about prices are di¤erent from the
actual price distribution raises a number of issues. To many economists
it may seem that the choice of agents beliefs must be arbitrary. In
section 5.5 we provide a discussion of this issue, we argue that there is
no arbitrariness in applications where i) the beliefs of agents are near-
rational, ii) the market outcome does not contradict agentsbeliefs in an
obvious way and iii) if the modelers assumption about agentsbeliefs
is made in a reasonable way. Related to this, we end the paper by
showing in section 6 that the REH does not prevent arbitrary outcomes:
even when a Bayesian REE emerges, the asset pricing predictions prove
extremely sensitive to ne details in agentsbeliefs about the dividend
process. Based on this we conclude that agentsprior beliefs may matter
much more than other economic factors for the behavior of equilibrium
stock prices in a Bayesian RE equilibrium. The pricing implications
in Bayesian RE equilibrium models thus appear more arbitrary than
previously recognized.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present a list
of unresolved issues in the adaptive learning literature. In section 3 we
introduce a simple stock pricing model with incomplete markets and het-
erogeneous agents, we show how to introduce internal rationality, derive
investors optimality conditions, and dene a competitive equilibrium
with internally rational agents. Section 4 compares our equilibrium con-
cept to Bayesian RE equilibrium and shows how agentsmarket knowl-
edge needs to be strengthened enormously in order for a discounted sum
of dividends and the Bayesian RE equilibrium to arise. Section 5 presents
a consistent set of beliefs where agents are uncertain about the mapping
from dividends to prices. It shows how to entertain small deviations
from REE beliefs and how least-squares learning equations then emerge
from an optimal use of information in a specic case. Section 6 presents
a formal result about the strong sensitivity of the discounted sum of
dividends to prior information about the dividend process. Section 7
discusses some of the related literature. A conclusion summarizes.
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2 Adaptive Learning Literature: Open Issues
The adaptive learning literature relaxes agentsknowledge about the be-
havior of market determined variables but also makes a number of ad-hoc
assumptions on agentsbehavior and learning mechanisms. These give
rise to important questions regarding the microfoundations of adaptive
learning models.
The source of the problem is as follows: the adaptive learning liter-
ature takes as point of departure the rst order optimality conditions
that emerge under the REH; it then replaces the rational expectations
operator E appearing in these optimality conditions by an operator of
perceived expectations eE; it then assumes that agents constantly re-
estimate the parameters involved in these perceived expectations in light
of new data using some stochastic approximation algorithm.
One element of arbitrariness arises because rst order conditions un-
der the REH can be written in many equivalent ways. One can then
replace rational expectations by the subjective operator eE in many dif-
ferent equations and, it turns out, depending on which version of the
RE formulation is used one can end up with rather di¤erent outcomes
under learning.
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010), for example, consider an asset
pricing model. They use a one-step-ahead asset pricing equation Pt =
 eEt(Pt+1+Dt+1) and show that a number of empirical stock price puzzles
can be explained if agents are learning about future price behavior. By
contrast Timmermann (1996) and others set the stock price equal to
expected discounted sum of dividends, i.e., uses Pt = eEtP1j=1 jDt+j,
and studies learning about discounted dividends, nding a much more
muted impact on stock prices from learning behavior. Which is the
rightway to set up the learning model?
Likewise, Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) have formulated DSGE
models under learning using one-step-ahead Euler equations while Pre-
ston (2005) showed that learning outcomes in a monetary model di¤er
when using the budget constraint to obtain a discounted sum formula-
tion of the optimality conditions. Again, which is the rightway to set
up the learning model?
Another element of arbitrariness emerges because a large number of
stochastic approximation algorithms are available to formulate estimates
of the parameters that determine agentsperceptions eE: The literature
has used a range of stochastic approximation algorithms, e.g., ordinary
least squares learning, constant gain learning, or switching gain algo-
rithms. Which is the rightway to model the response of expectations
to new data?
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Finally, while the perceptions eE are constantly evolving over time,
agents behave as if their current view will remain unchanged in the fu-
ture, following the anticipated utility concept of Kreps (1998). It is
unclear whether this way of decision making will lead to an admissible
plan in the Bayesian sense, i.e., whether there exists at all a dynami-
cally consistent subjective probability measure under which the agents
decisions resulting from this procedure are optimal.
Under the framework of this paper modeling choices are determined
from rational behavior of agents and the microeconomic specications
of the agents decision problem, including the agentssubjective beliefs
about external variables. Surprisingly, it will turn out that some of
the short-cuts of the adaptive learning literature are less ad-hoc than
might initially appear, and we nd that the one-step formulation of
Adam Marcet and Nicolini (2010) under OLS is optimal in some specic
models.
3 Internal Rationality with Imperfect Market Knowl-
edge
This section introduces the concept of internal rationality, shows how
to dene agents probability space and denes and characterizes the
competitive equilibrium with internal rationality.
To illustrate our approach we study a risk-neutral asset pricing model
with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. We choose such a
model for its simplicity and because we obtain very di¤erent pricing
implications from the standard case with perfect market knowledge.
Agents in our model di¤er in their discount factor and in their sub-
jective beliefs. Markets are incomplete because of the existence of con-
straints that limit the amount of stocks investors can buy or sell and
because contingent claim markets are unavailable. The presence of in-
vestor heterogeneity and market incompleteness allows us to distinguish
between investorsknowledge of their own decision problem and their
knowledge about market-determined variables, i.e., future asset prices,
which are also inuenced by the discount factors and beliefs of other
(possibly di¤erent) investors.
3.1 Basic Asset Pricing Model
The economy has t = 0; 1; 2; ::: periods and is populated by I innitely-
lived risk-neutral investor types. There is a unit mass of investors of
each type, all of them initially endowed with 1=I units of an innitely
lived stock. Agents of type i 2 f1; :::; Ig have a standard time-separable
7
utility function
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
 
i
t
Cit (1)
where Cit denotes consumption at t and 
i a type-specic discount factor.
The operator EP
i
0 denotes the agents expectations in some probability
space (
;S,P i), where 
 is the space of realizations, S the corresponding
-Algebra, and P i a subjective probability measure over (
;S). As
usual, the probability measure P i is a model primitive and given to
agents. It is allowed to be type-specic and, due to imperfect market
knowledge, it may or may not coincide with objective probabilities. The
stocks Sit owned by agents represent claims to an innitely lived tree that
yields each period Dt units of a perishable consumption good which are
paid as dividend.
The non-standard part in our formulation is in the underlying prob-
ability space. We consider agents who view the process for fPt; Dtg as
external to their decision problem and the probability space over which
they condition their choices is given by

  
P  
D
where 
X =
1Y
t=0
R+ with X 2 fP;Dg. The probability space thus
contains all possible sequences of prices and dividends. Letting S denote
the sigma-algebra of all Borel subsets of 
; we assume that type is beliefs
are given by a well dened probability measure P i over (
;S). As usual
we denote the set of all possible dividend histories up to period t by 
tD
and we let Dt 2 
tD denote a typical dividend history. Using similar
denitions for prices, the set of all histories up to period t is given by

t = 
tP  
tD and its typical element is denoted by !t 2 
t:
With this setup rational investors will condition their decisions on
the history of observed dividend and price realizations. This is a natural
setup in a model of competitive behavior: since investors see prices as a
stochastic variable that is beyond their control and since prices inuence
their budget constraint, investors want to condition their choices on the
realization of prices, in addition to the realization of dividends.
Note that we have endowed agents with a dynamically consistent
set of subjective beliefs, i.e., (
;S;P i) is a proper probability space,
P i satises all the standard probability axioms and gives proper joint
probabilities to all possible values of prices and dividends in any set of
dates. Moreover, although there is a time-invariant probability measure
P i, our setup is general enough to allow for agents that are learning
about the stochastic processes of prices and dividends. For example,
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P i could arise from a view that agents entertain about the stochastic
processes describing the evolution of prices and dividends and by some
prior beliefs about unknown parameters of these processes. A particular
example of this kind of subjective beliefs will be given in section 5.1.
Investors of type i choose consumption and stock holdings in period
t; denoted (Cit ; S
i
t) ; contingent on the observed history !
t = (P t; Dt),
i.e., investors choose a function 
Cit ; S
i
t

: 
t ! R2 (2)
for all t: The expected utility (1) associated with any such contingent
consumption choice can then be written as
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
 
i
t
Cit =
Z


1X
t=0
 
i
t
Cit(!
t) dP i(!): (3)
The stock can be purchased and sold costlessly in a perfectly competitive
spot market at ex-dividend price Pt. Agent i thereby faces the following
ow budget constraint
Cit + Pt S
i
t  (Pt +Dt)Sit 1 +  (4)
which has to hold for all t and all !t 2 
t: Here  denotes a su¢ ciently
large endowment of consumption goods, which is introduced for simplic-
ity: it allows us to ignore non-negativity constraints on consumption.9
Besides the budget constraint, consumers face the following limit
constraints on stock holdings:
Sit  0 (5)
Sit  S (6)
where 1 < S <1. Constraint (5) is a standard short-selling constraint
and often used in the literature. The second constraint (6) is a simplied
form of a leverage constraint capturing the fact that the consumer cannot
buy arbitrarily large amounts of stocks. Constraint (6) helps to insure
existence of a maximum in the presence of risk neutral investors.
We are now in a position to dene internal rationality within the
current setting:
Denition 1 (Internal Rationality) Agent i is internally rational if
she chooses the functions (2) to maximize expected utility (3) subject to
the budget constraint (4), and the limit constraints (5) and (6), taking
as given the probability measure P i.
9No substantial result depends on the fact that the non-negativity constraint on
consumption is not binding.
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For more general settings, internal rationality requires that agents
maximize their objective function taking into account all relevant con-
straints, that they condition their actions on the history of all observable
external variables, and that they evaluate the probability of future exter-
nal outcomes using a consistent set of subjective beliefs, which is given
to them from the outset.
Within the context of the present model we assume that P i satises
EP
i
[Pt+1 +Dt+1j!t] <1 for all !; t; i (7)
and that a maximum of the investors utility maximization problem ex-
ists.10
3.2 Optimality Conditions
Under internal rationality the space of outcomes 
 considered by agents
includes all external variables, i.e., the histories of prices and the history
of dividends. Agents can thus assign a consistent set of probabilities
to all payo¤ relevant external events. Consequently, the rst order op-
timality conditions are found in a standard way. In particular, one of
the following conditions has to hold for all periods t and for almost all
realizations in !t 2 
t :
Pt < 
i EP
i
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1) and S
i
t = S (8a)
Pt = 
i EP
i
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1) and S
i
t 2

0; S

(8b)
Pt > 
i EP
i
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1) and S
i
t = 0 (8c)
where EP
i
t denotes the expectation conditional on !
t computed with the
measure P i. Since the objective function is concave and the feasible set
is convex these equations determine necessary conditions for the agents
optimal investment decisions.
Importantly, the optimality conditions are of the one-step-ahead form,
i.e., they involve todays price and the expected price and dividend to-
morrow. Therefore, to take optimal decisions the agent only needs to
know whether the observed realization !t implies that the expected stock
return is higher, equal or lower than the inverse of the own discount fac-
tor. Since agents can trade stocks in any period without transaction
costs, the one-step-ahead optimality conditions (8) deliver optimal in-
vestment choices, even if stocks can be held for an arbitrary number of
periods.
10Appendix A.1 shows that the existence of a maximum can be guaranteed by
bounding the utility function. For notational simplicity we treat the case with linear
utility in the main text and assume existence of a maximum.
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Just to emphasize, it is not true that an internally rational agent has
to compare todays price with the discounted sum of dividends in order
to act optimally! Intuitively, our agents simply try to buy low and sell
highas much as the stock holding constraints allow them. This is the
optimal strategy because it is optimal for agents to engage in speculative
behavior in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1978).
We show below that with imperfect market knowledge, an agents
expectations of the future price is not determined by the agents dividend
expectations and internal rationality. The rst order conditions above,
therefore, turn out to be equivalent to a discounted sum of dividend
formulation only in very special cases.
3.3 Standard Belief Formulation: A Singularity
The setup for beliefs dened in the previous section di¤ers from standard
dynamic economic modeling practice, which imposes additional restric-
tions on beliefs. Specically, the standard belief specication assumes
that agents formulate probability beliefs only over the reduced state
space 
D and that agentschoices are contingent on the history of div-
idends only. Agents are then endowed with the knowledge that each
realization Dt 2 
tD is associated with a given level of the stock price
Pt, which amounts to endowing agents with knowledge of a function
Pt : 

t
D ! R+ (9)
The probabilities for the price process are then constructed from knowl-
edge of this function and beliefs over 
D: Once this function is observed
prices carry only redundant information, there is no need to condition
choices on the history of prices and there is no loss in optimality by ex-
cluding prices from the state space. Clearly, knowledge of the function
(9) represents knowledge regarding market outcomes: agents know ex-
actly which market outcome is going to be associated with a particular
history of fundamentals.
This standard belief specication can thus be interpreted as a special
case of the formulation outlined in the previous section, namely one
where P i is assumed to impose a degeneracy between pairs (P t; Dt).
In contrast, our more general belief formulation outlined in section 3.1
allows agents to be uncertain about the relation between prices and
dividends.
The standard formulation using degenerate beliefs is consistent with
the rational expectations equilibrium outcome, so no loss of generality
is implied by imposing the singularity in P i from the outset under the
REH. But as we will show in sections 3.5 and 4 below, knowledge of
this singularity is not a consequence of agentsability to maximize their
11
utility or to behave rationally given their subjective beliefs. Instead, it
is the result of a set of strong assumptions that imply that agents know
from the outset how the market works. Indeed, a su¢ cient condition
for agents to work out the equilibrium price function will be that agents
know the market so well that they are able to map each potential future
dividend sequence into a single value for the stock price. Given that
such a relationship between dividends and prices remains fairly elusive
to academic economists - these still entertain a range of alternative asset
pricing models each of which implies a di¤erent function Pt - it seems
equally reasonable to consider agents who are also not fully certain about
the map linking dividends to prices. Imperfect knowledge about market
behavior is thus naturally modeled by allowing agents to entertain beliefs
about the joint process for prices and dividends that does not impose a
singularity.
3.4 Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(IREE)
This section considers the process for competitive equilibrium prices with
internally rational agents and denes an Internally Rational Expecta-
tions Equilibrium (IREE).
We propose a competitive equilibrium denition that is as close as
possible to the standard formulation. The denition below is specic to
our stock pricing model but is easily extended to more general setups.
Let (
D;SD;PD) be a probability space with 
D denoting the space of
dividend histories and PD the objectiveprobability measure for divi-
dends. Let !D 2 
D denote a typical innite history of dividends.
Denition 2 (IREE) An Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(IREE) consists of a sequence of equilibrium price functions fPtg1t=0
where Pt : 
tD ! R+ for each t, contingent choices fCit ; Sitg1t=0 of the
form (2) and probability beliefs P i for each agent i, such that
(1) all agents i = 1; :::; I are internally rational, and
(2) when agents evaluate fCit ; Sitg at equilibrium prices, markets clear
for all t and all !D 2 
D almost surely in PD.
Verbally, an IREE is a competitive equilibrium allowing for the pos-
sibility that agentssubjective density about future prices and dividends
is not necessarily equal to the objective density. Or equivalently, it is an
equilibrium in which agents are internally rational but not necessarily
externally rational.
Quite a few papers have previously studied Arrow-Debreu (AD) mod-
els in which agentssubjective probability densities about fundamentals
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may not coincide with the actual densities of the fundamentals.11 It is
important to note that an IREE is not a special case of this literature.
The reason is that in the AD framework embodies two basic features: i)
any physical good is treated as a di¤erent good if delivered in a di¤erent
period or for a di¤erent realization; ii) agents observe the equilibrium
prices for all goods. These two features together imply that the equilib-
rium price function (9) is known to agents. We consider cases where the
singularity in beliefs is absent because there does not exist a full set of
contingent claim markets.
We now determine the equilibrium price mappings Pt in the above
asset pricing model. Equilibrium prices will depend on standard micro-
economic fundamentals such as utility functions, discount factors, and
dividend beliefs, but also on agentsprice beliefs given by the probabil-
ity measures P i. Moreover, since agents do not necessarily hold rational
price expectations, we need to distinguish between the stochastic process
for equilibrium prices Pt and agentsperceived price process Pt. The
rst order conditions (8) imply that the asset is held by the agent type
with the most optimistic beliefs about the discounted expected price and
dividend in the next period.12 Equilibrium prices thus satisfy:13
Pt = max
i2I
h
i EP
i
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1)
i
(10)
The next section discusses, whether agents could deduce the equilibrium
price function (10) from the information that is available to them.
3.5 Is Internal Rationality Su¢ cient to Derive a
Singularity in Beliefs?
The equilibrium price function Pt : 
tD ! R+ emerging in an IREE is
indeed a function of the history of dividends only. This implies that the
objective density over prices and dividends features a singularity. In light
of these observations it is natural to ask whether knowledge that this
singularity exists would be su¢ cient to allow internally rational agents
to compute the correct equilibrium price functions through a process
11See Blume and Easley (2006) for a recent application.
12This emerges because we assume S > 1 so that the constraint (6) never binds in
equilibrium. Extensions to the case with S < 1 are straightfoward.
13Since expectations EP
i
t are conditional on the realization Pt, the equilibrium
price a¤ects both sides of the expression above and, at this level of generality, it is
unclear whether there always exists an equilibrium price Pt for any given dividend
history Dt or whether it is unique, see also the discussion in Adam (2003). At this
point, we proceed by simply assuming existence and uniqueness, we leave this issue
for further research. See footnote 21 for a discussion of existence and uniqueness in
the specic asset pricing model that we consider.
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of deductive reasoning. Or equivalently, does internal rationality imply
external rationality if agents know that dividends are the only source of
fundamental disturbances?
The answer to both of these questions turns out to be no. As
we show below, the problem is that knowledge of the existence of a
degeneracy falls short of informing agents about its exact location. This
holds true even if the equilibrium asset pricing equation (10) is common
knowledge to all agents. This in turn provides a natural interpretation
for why agentsbeliefs might not contain a singularity, even though in the
model the objective density possesses a singularity: agents are simply
uncertain about the correct model linking stock prices to the history
of dividends, and they express this uncertainty using a non-degenerate
system of beliefs P i over prices and dividends.
We now show that the singularity is not easily located. Let mt :

tD ! f1; : : : ; Ig denote the marginal agent pricing the asset in period
t in equilibrium:14
mt = argmax
i2I
h
i EP
i
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1)
i
(11)
Clearly the equilibrium price (10) can thus be written as
Pt = 
mt EP
m t
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1) (12)
We now suppose that agents know that the equilibrium price satises
equation (12) each period and that this is common knowledge.15 Do-
ing so endows agents with a considerable amount of information about
how the market prices the asset. Specically, common knowledge im-
plies that each agent knows that other agents know that the asset is
priced according to (12) each period, that each agents knows that other
agents know that others know it to be true, and so on to innity.16 We
can express this formally by saying that from the agentsviewpoint the
following equation holds
Pt = 
mt EP
m t
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1) (13)
and that each agent has price and dividend beliefs P i that are consis-
tent with this equation. The question we are posing is: would common
14If the argmax is non-unique we can use a selection criterion from among all
marginal agents. For example, we can take mt to be the marginal agent with the
lowest index i.
15Internally rational agents do not need to have such knowledge to behave optimally
conditional on their beliefs.
16See Aumann (1976) for a formal denition.
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knowledge of equation (13) allow internally rational agents to impose re-
strictions on price beliefs as a function of their beliefs about dividends?
Would it allow agents to determine a singularity?
Common knowledge of equation (13) allows agents to iterate forward
on this equation, say T times, to nd
Pt = 
mt EP
m t
t (Dt+1)
+ mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1 Dt+2

(14)
+ mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1

mt+2EP
m t+2
t+2 Dt+3

+ :::
+ mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1

: : : mt+TEP
m t+T
t+T (Pt+T+1 +Dt+T+1)

The last three lines of the right-hand side of this equation provide an al-
ternative expression for agentsdiscounted expectations of next periods
price. They show that knowledge of (13) implies that agentsprice ex-
pectations are given by their beliefs about which agents are going to
be marginal in the future and by their beliefs about what beliefs future
marginal agents will hold about future dividends and the terminal price.
Since agent i is not marginal in all periods and since agent i can ra-
tionally believe other agents to hold rather di¤erent beliefs, own beliefs
about dividends fail to restrict the beliefs agent i can entertain about
prices. For example, agent i can believe the future discounted sum of
dividends to be low but at the same time believe the future price to be
high - all that is required is that the agent believes future marginal agents
to be relatively more optimistic about future dividends and prices.
In the literature, the discounted sum of dividends is usually obtained
by applying the law of iterated expectations on the right side of equation
(14). This can be done whenever all conditional expectations are with
respect to the same probability measure, e.g., if mt is constant through
time. In our model mt is random whenever P i assigns positive probabil-
ity to the event that the agent may not be marginal at some point in the
future. If in addition the agent believes that other agents hold di¤erent
(price and dividend) beliefs, then the law of iterated expectations can
not be applied to (14).17 Price expectations then fail to be determined
by agentsdividend expectations. This shows that own dividend beliefs,
knowledge of (13), and internal rationality are not su¢ cient conditions
for agentsbeliefs P i to contain a specic singularity where prices are
equal to a discounted sum of dividends. The next section explores this
issue further by actually providing su¢ cient additional conditions un-
17Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) and Preston (2005) make a similar point in di¤erent
models.
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der which internally rational agents would have to incorporate such a
singularity.
4 Bayesian Rational Expectations Equilibrium
This section derives su¢ cient conditions that would allow internally ra-
tional agents to impose the correctsingularity in their subjective beliefs
P i over prices and dividends, as it emerges in equilibrium. Specically,
we show that to be able to deduce the correct equilibrium pricing func-
tion Pt, agents require a tremendous amount of information about the
market. This conrms conjectures expressed previously by Bray and
Kreps (1987) regarding the strong informational requirements underly-
ing Bayesian REE models.
We start by providing a denition of a Bayesian REE. While our
denition is stated in terms of our previous denition of an IREE, the
resulting equilibrium notion nevertheless agrees with that provided in
most of the literature.
Denition 3 (Bayesian REE) A Bayesian Rational Expectations Equi-
librium is an Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium in which agents
subjective beliefs P i are consistent with the equilibrium price function Pt,
i.e.
ProbP
i
(Pt = Pt j Dt) = 1
for all t; !; i:
Verbally, a Bayesian REE is an IREE in which all agents associate
with each possible partial dividend history the correct equilibrium price.
The term Bayesianin this denition reects the fact that agentsknowl-
edge about the dividend process is allowed to be imperfect. For example,
agents may be uncertain about some of the parameters in the law of mo-
tion of dividends. When all agents know the true process for dividends,
then the Bayesian REE simplies further to a standard REE.
We now provide su¢ cient conditions on P i so that the IREE reduces
to a Bayesian REE. As in the previous section, we start by endowing
agents with knowledge of how the market prices the asset for all periods
t and all states !:
Assumption 1 It is common knowledge that equation (13) holds for
all t and all ! 2 
.
This allows agents to iterate on the equilibrium asset price equation
(13) to obtain equation (14). Importantly, agents can not iterate on
their own rst order optimality conditions because these do not always
hold with equality.
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The discounted sum expression (14) still contains expectations about
the terminal price Pt+T . To eliminate price expectations altogether, one
thus needs to impose that all agents know that the equilibrium asset
price satises a no-rational-bubblerequirement:
Assumption 2 It is common knowledge that
lim
T!1
mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1

: : : mt+TEP
m t+T
t+T (Pt+T )

= 0
for all t and all ! 2 
.
Assumption 2 again provides information about the market: all agents
know that marginal agents expect future marginal agents to expect (and
so on to innity) that prices grow at a rate less than the correspond-
ing discount factors. In the case with homogeneous expectations and
discount factors this requirement reduces to the familiar condition:
lim
T!1
EPt
 
T Pt+T

= 0 (15)
Note, that even this more familiar no-rational-bubblecondition endows
agents with knowledge of how themarket prices the asset asymptotically,
it does not just arise from rational behavior.
Assumption 2 allows to take the limit T ! 1 in equation (13) and
to abstract from expectations about the terminal selling price to obtain:
Pt = 
mt EP
m t
t (Dt+1)
+ mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1 Dt+1

+ mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1

mt+2EP
m t+2
t+2 Dt+2

+ ::: (16)
One thus obtains an expression for the asset price in terms of the ex-
pected discounted sum of marginal agentsexpectations of future mar-
ginal agents dividend expectations, and so on. Agents may, however,
still entertain a range of views about who will be marginal in the future
and what the dividend expectations of such marginal agents are going
to be. Assumptions 1-2 are thus still not su¢ cient for rational agents to
associate a single equilibrium price with each dividend history Dt 2 
tD.
For equation (16) to impose a singularity, agents have to believe in a
given mapping mt : 
tD ! f1; : : : ; Ig and they must know the discount
factor i and the probability measure P i for all other agents i: Only
then can a rational agent use equation (16) and the own beliefs about
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the dividend process to evaluate the right side of (16), i.e., can associate
a single price outcome with any dividend history Dt.
Furthermore, in a Bayesian REE the resulting price beliefs must be
objectively true given the dividend history. This fails to be the case if
agents employ an arbitrary mapping mt. Therefore, agents must employ
the mapping mt that is objectively true in equilibrium! Letting mt :

tD ! f1; 2; : : : ; Ig denote this equilibrium mapping, we need
Assumption 3 The equilibrium functions mt for all t, the discount
factors i and the probability measures P i for all i are known to
all agents.
Clearly, Assumption 3 incorporates a tremendous amount of knowl-
edge about the market: agents need to know for each possible dividend
history which agent is marginal, what is the marginal agents discount
factor, and the marginal agents belief system. Only then can agents im-
pose the correct singularity (16) on their joint beliefs about the behavior
of prices and dividends.
The simplest and most common way in the literature to impose As-
sumptions 1-3 is to consider the leading asset pricing example, i.e., a
representative agent model with sequentially complete markets and price
beliefs that satisfy the no rational bubble requirement (15). If the repre-
sentative agent knows that she is marginal at all times and contingencies,
her rst order condition holds with equality at all periods. She can then
iterate on it and evaluate future expectations by applying the law of iter-
ated expectations to own beliefs. In this specic case, internal rationality
(plus assumption 2) implies equality between the equilibrium asset price
and the discounted sum of dividends. The leading asset price exam-
ple may thus erroneously suggest that the equality between the market
clearing asset price and the expected discounted sum of dividends is a
natural outcome of internally rational investment behavior, but clearly
this is not true more generally. Indeed, the commonly made assumption
that the agent knows to be marginal at all timesis an indirect way to
make Assumption 3, i.e., an assumption that appears rather unnatural
when allowing for heterogeneity and incomplete markets. Since homo-
geneous agent models are best thought of as rough approximations to
heterogeneous agent models, the assumption that agents know that they
are marginal at each time should be as unappealing as making Assump-
tion 3.
The fact that strong assumptions have to be imposed for the REH
to emerge raises the important question of how agents could have possi-
bly acquired such detailed knowledge about the working of the market?
Given that equilibrium prices do not even come close to revealing the
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underlying process for market microeconomic fundamentals (mt, 
i and
P i), it is hard to see how an agent could possibly be certain from the
outset about the relation between dividends and prices. Given this, it
seems to us worthwhile to pursue the concept of IREE, where agents do
not know the equilibrium pricing function from the outset.
5 Asset Pricing with Imperfect Market Knowledge
This section presents a specic example showing how one can slightly
relax the strong market knowledge assumptions underlying a Bayesian
REE. The example is of interest because it shows - perhaps surprisingly
- that for some models the standard approach taken in the adaptive
learning literature, as discussed in section 2, can be consistent with in-
ternal rationality. Specically, we show that the asset pricing model in
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010), which uses a one-step-ahead pricing
equation and replaces the expectations operator in this equation by a
least squares learning algorithm, can be derived from a model with in-
ternally rational agents whose prior beliefs are close to the RE beliefs.
This is important because the learning model explored in Adam, Marcet
and Nicolini gives rise to equilibrium prices dynamics that quantitatively
replicate a wide range of asset pricing facts within a very simple setup.
The model below abstracts from heterogeneity amongst agents and
considers instead a model with homogenous agents. Heterogeneity was
useful in the previous section to highlight that in realistic models a huge
amount of market knowledge is required for agents to deduce market
outcomes and for a Bayesian REE to arise, but heterogeneity is not
crucial for the characterization in this section. All we require is that
homogeneity amongst agents fails to be common knowledge, so that
agents cannot deduce the market outcome from what they know.18
We start by determining the REE, then show how one can relax
slightly the singularity in prior beliefs that agents are assumed to enter-
tain in the REE. Finally, we show how Bayesian learning about the price
process gives rise to the ordinary least squares (OLS) learning equations
assumed in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010).
18Alternatively, the homogeneous agent model below could be interpreted as an
approximation to the solution of a heterogeneous agent model in which the degree
of heterogeneity is vanishing but where vanishing heterogeneity fails to be common
knowledge.
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5.1 Perfect Knowledge Benchmark (REE)
We consider risk neutral agents who share the same beliefs and the same
discount factor . The true process for dividends is assumed to follow
logDt=Dt 1 = log a+ log "t (17)
with a > 0, log "t  iiN (0; 2) and D 1 > 0 given. Log dividends
thus grow at the rate log a on average and dividend growth innovations
are unpredictable. When the dividend process (17) and homogeneity of
agents is common knowledge, i.e., if agents know all relevant features
of other agents in the market, then internal rationality implies that the
market equilibrium is given by the REE outcome, i.e.,
PREt =
 a e
2=2
1   a e2=2Dt
The RE equilibrium price process thus evolves according to
logPREt =P
RE
t 1 = log a+ log "t (18)
so that prices grow at the same rate as dividends. The stochastic inno-
vation in the price growth process is thereby the same as in the dividend
growth process, illustrating the existence of a singularity in the joint
evolution of prices and dividends. While it is well known that these
aspects of the REE solution are empirically unappealing, our discussion
in section 3 about market knowledge suggests that they may be equally
unappealing on theoretical grounds. The next section relaxes agents
knowledge about the stochastic processes (17) and (18).
5.2 Imperfect Knowledge: Relaxing REE Priors
We now relax the assumption that homogeneity of agents is common
knowledge. Instead we assume that agents have imperfect knowledge
about other agentspreferences and beliefs. The discussion in sections 3
and 4 show that this allows us to consider internally rational agents that
hold subjective beliefs P which di¤er from the ones they are assumed to
entertain in the REE. We also how one can choose agentsbeliefs to be
arbitrarily close to REE beliefs.
Specically, we assume that agents believe prices and dividends to
evolve according to the following process
logPt=Pt 1
logDt=Dt 1

=

log P
log D

+

log "Pt
log "Dt

(19)
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for given (P 1; D 1) and with
(log "Pt ; log "
D
t )
0  iiN(0;)
 =

2P PD
PD 
2
D

This specication allows for di¤erent growth rates of prices and dividends
and for innovations to prices and dividends that are only imperfectly
correlated. Unlike section 5.1 we now consider agents who are uncertain
about the mean growth rates of prices
 
log P

and dividends (log D)
and about the covariance matrix of innovations (). We capture agents
uncertainty at time zero by prior beliefs about these unknown parameters
and summarize these by a probability density function
(log P ; log D;)  f
The prior beliefs f together with the laws of motion (19) fully deter-
mine agentsprobability measure P over innite sequences of price and
dividends realizations.19
The previous system of beliefs gives rise to the beliefs that agents
entertain in the REE in the special case when the prior f assigns prob-
ability one to the outcome
P = D = a ,  = 2

1 1
1 1

We call this the RE priorand let PRE denote the associated probability
measure over sequences of prices and dividends. The singularity in this
measure shows up in the form of a singular covariance matrix .
We now relax these RE priors slightly. The relaxation gives rise to
an alternative probability measure P without a singularity in the joint
density over prices and dividends. We also explain what we mean by a
small deviation from REE beliefs.
In the interest of obtaining closed form solutions for the evolution
of the posterior beliefs, we use a conjugate prior specication for f that
is of the Normal-Wishart form. Specically, we consider prior beliefs of
the form
H  W (S0; n0) (20a) 
log P ; log D
0H = h  N  log P0 ; log D0 0 ; (0h) 1 (20b)
19Given this structure, the probabilities assigned by P can be obtained as follows:
for any Borel subset s  S, determine the likelihood of prices and dividends being
in s for any given value of (log P ; log D;) using standard methods for Markov
processes applied to equation (19). Then integrate these probabilities over values of
(log P ; log D;) according to f .
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for given parameters log P0 ; log 
D
0 ; 0; S0 and n0. The Wishart distri-
bution W with variance-covariance matrix S0 and n0 > 1 degrees of
freedom species agentsmarginal prior about the inverse of the vari-
ance covariance matrix of innovations H   1, where n0 scales the
precision of prior beliefs. The normal distribution N species agents
priors about the parameters
 
log P ; log D

conditional on the preci-
sion matrix H being equal to h, where
 
log P0 ; log 
D
0

denotes the con-
ditional prior mean and 0 > 0 scales the precision of prior beliefs about 
log P ; log D

.
We further restrict our attention to prior beliefs such that 
P0 ; 
D
0

= (a; a) (21)
S0 = 
2

1 1  
1   1

(22)
This implies that agentsbeliefs are initially centered at the REE. More-
over, in the limiting case with vanishing prior uncertainty (n0; 0 ! 1
with n0=v0 ! 1) and perfectly correlated innovations ( ! 0) the re-
sulting beliefs P converge in distribution to PRE: In other words, we
have weak convergence to RE beliefs. It is in this precise sense that
for large (n0; 0), small  and initial values given by equations (21) and
(22), agentsbeliefs P involve only a small deviation from REE beliefs.
The next section determines the equilibrium asset prices implied by
the beliefs P.
5.3 Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium
When all agentsbeliefs are given by P, it follows from equations (13)
and (19) that the equilibrium asset price is given by
Pt = E
P
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1)
= EPt

elog 
P
elog "
P
t+1

Pt + E
P
t

elog 
D
elog "
D
t+1

Dt (23)
The equilibrium price thus depends on agentsconditional time t expec-
tations of elog 
X
elog "
X
t+1 (for X 2 fP;Dg). The next section determines
the evolution of these conditional expectations over time and shows that
they can be described by ordinary least squares (OLS) learning rules.
5.4 Bayesian Updating and OLS Learning
We now show that for the beliefs specied in the previous sections, op-
timal belief updating in an IREE gives rise to the least squares learning
equations that have been typically studied in the adaptive learning lit-
erature.
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We start by determining the posterior beliefs for log P ; log D and
. We thereby use the fact that our prior specication (20) is conjugate,
so that the posterior in period t is again of the Normal-Wishart form
(20).20 The posterior is given by
H j !t W (St; nt) (24a) 
log P ; log D
0H = h; !t N  log Pt ; log Dt 0 ; (th) 1 (24b)
where the parameters
 
log Pt ; log 
D
t ; t; St; nt

evolve recursively as fol-
lows: 
log Pt+1
log Dt+1

=

log Pt
log Dt

+
1
t + 1
et (25a)
t+1 = t + 1 (25b)
S 1t+1 = S
 1
t +
t
t + 1
ete
0
t (25c)
nt+1 = nt + 1 (25d)
with et denoting the one-step-ahead forecast error:
et =
 
log Pt
Pt 1
  log Pt
log Dt
Dt 1
  log Dt
!
Letting denote an approximation that is correct up to rst order,
appendix A.2 shows that the posterior beliefs imply that the conditional
expectations appearing in the pricing equation (23) are given by
EPt

elog 
P
e
2
P =2

 bPt (26)
with bPt denoting the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of stock
price growth given by
bPt  1t+ 0
tX
j=1
Pj
Pj 1
+
0
t+ 0
P0
20The subsequent result follows from Theorem 1, chapter 9.10 in DeGroot (1970).
Our variables can be mapped into the ones employed in DeGroots theorem using:
h ! r, H ! R, nt ! , S 1t !  ,

log Pt ; log 
P
t
0
! , t ! . Unlike DeG-
root, we parameterize Normal and Wishart distributions using variance-covariance
matrices rather than precision matrices, as this has become more common nowadays.
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Note that the OLS estimator incorporates the prior P0 by treating it like
0 observations of stock price growth in the data. Similar approximations
for dividend expectations yield
EPt

elog 
D
e
2
D=2

 bDt  1t+ 0
tX
i=0
Di
Di 1
+
0
t+ 0
D0
so that the pricing equation (23) implies - up to a rst order approxi-
mation of conditional expectations - that
Pt =  bPt Pt +  bDt Dt (27)
or, equivalently
Pt =
bDt
1  bPt Dt (28)
This is the equation studied by Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010). This
equation clearly says that learning about price growth behavior inu-
ences equilibrium stock prices in a model with internally rational agents
who hold a complete and consistent set of probability beliefs. Speci-
cally, it is clear that higher expected price growth bPt implies a higher
price-dividend ratio and this is what generates the price dynamics stud-
ied in that paper.21
5.5 Specifying AgentsBeliefs
Our denitions of internal rationality and Internally Rational Expecta-
tions Equilibrium (IREE) take agentsbeliefs P as exogenously given.
This allows to formulate simple microfoundations and to apply standard
dynamic modeling tools. It also reects the fact that - once one departs
from the REH - agentsbeliefs P inevitably become part of the micro-
foundations of the model and thus a choice variable for the economic
21Equation (28) reveals that existence of an equilibrium price requires that the
(approximate) posterior mean for expected price growth bPt remains below  1. In
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010) this condition is insured by imposing an ad-hoc
continuous projection facility on beliefs, which bounded mean price growth expecta-
tions below  1. We conjecture that this can be obtained from a consistent system
of beliefs P by truncating the upper tail of the prior density f for the unknown pa-
rameter log P . Also, since the equilibrium price Pt a¤ects the left and right hand
side of equation (28) there may actually exist multiple or no mutually consistent
equilibrium price and belief pairs. To avoid this, the estimate bPt in Adam, Marcet
and Nicolini (2010) is computed using prices up to period t   1 only. Adam and
Marcet (2010) provide an information structure where such delayed updating arises
from fully Bayesian updating behavior in a setting where agents nevertheless observe
contemporaneous prices and dividends.
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modeler. In contrast, when working under the REH, agentsbeliefs P
are largely dictated by the remaining micro-foundations of the model,
so that economic modelers typically do not have to specify agentsbe-
liefs.22 While the REH simplies model construction enormously, we
have argued that this way of specifying beliefs may not be the most
plausible one: it incorporates a singularity into agentsbeliefs that con-
tains so much information about market behavior that not even expert
economists can plausibly claim to possess.
When departing from the REH, one inevitably has to specify agents
beliefs; and this endows the economic modeler with additional degrees
of freedom. While these could be used in an unfruitful way, it is equally
possible that economists will learn to employ these degrees of freedom
productively. In this section we o¤er some preliminary comments on
belief selection - most of the issues we address are still part of ongoing
research.
To avoid arbitrary belief specications, it appears desirable when
specifying agentsbelief systems to incorporate some concept of near-
rationality with respect to the resulting equilibrium outcomes.
In the present paper we propose to consider agents whose beliefs are
close (in distribution) to REE beliefs, as discussed in section 5.2. Study-
ing such small deviations from REE beliefs appears of interest because
anyone willing to assign to agents the REE beliefs should be equally
willing to explore the consequences of endowing agents with small devi-
ations from such beliefs. This is especially true if such small deviations
are associated with a considerable improvement in the empirical perfor-
mance of the model, as shown in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010). In
the present model, this feature also insures that agentsbeliefs are close
to the resulting equilibrium outcomes because the equilibrium outcomes
are continuous with respect to agentsbeliefs.
More generally, one might ask whether decision makers maintain a
system of beliefs P, as we assumed, if they observe equilibrium prices
that have a distribution di¤erent from P? This can only be expected if
the belief system P is not too obviously wrong after observations of the
actual equilibrium outcomes in the model are available. This is the case,
if beliefs and actual outcomes are close (in distribution), or if agents
beliefs converge over time to such a situation, or if agents even learn over
time to make RE predictions. In the latter case, agents would realize in
the long run that their beliefs are correct and thus have no incentive to
change their belief system P. For the homogenous agent version of the
asset pricing model considered in this paper, Adam, Marcet and Nicolini
22Exceptions arise whenever the RE equilibrium fails to be unique, as is the case
in many monetary models, for example.
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(2010) show that least squares learning converges globally and almost
surely to RE. Therefore, agents in the setup studied in this paper will not
change the model on which they are basing their beliefs after observing
the equilibrium outcomes for a large number of periods.
Belief systems P are unlikely to be kept for long, however, if they
assign zero likelihood to outcomes that agents can actually observe in
equilibrium. The observation of zero probability (more precisely, zero
density) events would tell agents that their belief systems are incompat-
ible with the observed equilibrium path and it should induce reasonable
agents to immediately adjust their beliefs. In the present paper, we
avoided this problem by specifying beliefs that have full support over
all outcomes, therefore, any combination of prices and dividends has
positive density.23
Future research might show that other features could also give rise
to unattractive belief systems. Indeed, determining what constitutes
acceptable belief specications promises to be an exciting avenue for
further research.24
Macroeconomists sometimes appear reluctant to consider relaxations
of the REH. This may partly be motivated by the fear that economists
could then start choosing belief systems for their models that appear
unattractive when compared to the equilibrium implications they gen-
erate. We propose to interpret such outcomes simply as bad modeling
choices, something that can happen in all aspects of economic modeling,
e.g., even when it comes to choosing utility functions. While economists
could make unreasonable utility specications, this does not imply that
the task of specifying appropriate utility functions would not be use-
ful: important progress has been made, for example, by showing which
preference specications are consistent with the Kaldor facts. Similar
progress appears possible when it comes to determining appropriate be-
lief systems.
Finding the right way to model expectations promises to be an ex-
citing avenue for research. Discipline can be imposed, not only by re-
23Some of the literature employing near-rationalor robustbelief systems, e.g.,
Woodford (2010) or Hansen and Sargent (2009), has avoided such inconsistencies
by requiring that near-rational beliefs are absolutely continuous with respect to the
equilibrium outcomes.
24For example, we nd it equally acceptable in our model to assume that agents
use a constant gain learning algorithm instead of the OLS learning equations. This
would be an IREE if the belief system is as specied in section 5.2 but has time-
varying parameters (log P ; log D) in the law of motion (19), with these parameters
following independent unit root processes. As long as the variance of the innovation
in the unit root processes also becomes arbitrarily small, the implied constant gain
becomes small and we still have weak convergence in distribution to REE beliefs.
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stricting agents to be near-rational, but also by using the many available
sources of indirect data on expectations, including survey evidence and
nancial market data which is closely linked to investorsexpectations.
6 Sensitivity of Bayesian REE Asset Prices
This section demonstrates that the asset price in a Bayesian REE is
extremely sensitive to ne details in the specication of agentsprior be-
liefs about dividend growth. Indeed, details of agentsprior beliefs about
dividend growth matter much more for asset prices than the microeco-
nomic structure of the economy. Since economists will probably never
nd out about details on the prior, this represents a degree of freedom
in Bayesian REE modeling that strongly inuences the Bayesian REE
asset price.
For simplicity, we consider again a homogeneous agent model in
which all agents hold the same discount factor and dividend beliefs and
where this is common knowledge. Each internally rational agent can
then deduce the Bayesian REE asset price associated with any history
of dividends. This price is given by
Pt = E
P
 
lim
T!1
TX
j=1
jDt+j
Dt
!
(29)
but turns out to be extremely sensitive with respect to the prior beliefs
about the dividend process incorporated in P. Specically, as we show
in proposition 2 below, the equilibrium price can be increased by any
desired amount by simply reallocating an arbitrarily small amount of
prior probability mass.
To illustrate this point we rewrite the dividend process as
Dt = aDt 1t (30)
where t > 0 is i.i.d. with E [t] = 1 and a > 0.
25 Agentsprior density
about a is denoted by f and satises f(~a) = 0 for all ~a  0. The posterior
density about a conditional on any observed history Dt is denoted by
Postt.
The following proposition provides a rst result. It shows that unless
the posterior beliefs about dividend growth are bounded by the inverse
of the discount factor, equilibrium prices are innite. The proof of the
proposition can be found in appendix A.3.
25The parameter a in the equation above is not exactly equal to the one employed
in equation (17), but this is of no importance for the results that follow.
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Proposition 1 Consider the Bayesian REE asset price (29). For any
t and Dt :
1. If Postt(a   1) > 0, then
Pt =1
2. Let B denote the upper bound of the support of Postt. If B < 
 1
then
Pt = Dt EPostt

a
1  a

<1 (31)
The previous proposition is closely related to results derived in Pe-
saran, Pettenuzzo and Timmermann (2007), but also di¤ers because it
does not rely on parametric forms for the prior beliefs.26 This will prove
useful below for showing that the sensitivity of prices to priors is a gen-
eral phenomenon.
Proposition 1 above shows that the asset price is nite whenever the
support of the posterior density is bounded below  1. This can be
insured, for example, by choosing prior beliefs f with an upper bound
of the support B <  1. The posterior beliefs will then inherit this
property. This in turn might suggest that Bayesian REE asset prices
can not be arbitrarily high provided one imposes an upper bound B <
 1 on the support of prior dividend growth beliefs. Yet, the following
proposition, which is proven in appendix A.3, shows that this fails to be
true:
Proposition 2 Consider a prior density f with upper bound B <  1
for its support. There exists a sequence of densities

fk
	
with upper
bound Bk <  1 and
R fk   f  ! 0 such that the Bayesian REE price
implied by fk converges to innity as k !1.
Bounding the prior support is thus not a very robust solution to the
problem for the high sensitivity of Bayesian REE asset prices: given
any prior that implies bounded prices, there exists another prior that
is arbitrarily close to it and that gives rise to prices that are arbitrarily
large.
Due to a (well-acknowledged) shortcut this sensitivity of Bayesian
REE asset prices sometimes failed to show up in some of the Bayesian
26The result in proposition 1 also di¤ers from the examples in Geweke (2001) and
Weitzman (2007) where non-existence of expected utility does not arise from a di-
verging innite discounted sum. Instead, in these papers one-period-ahead expected
consumption utility already fails to be nite.
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REE literature. Timmermann (1993, 1996), for example, ignores the
posterior uncertainty about a and uses instead only the posterior mean
for a to evaluate the discounted sum in equation (29) to set
Pt = Dt
 EPostt(a)
1   EPostt(a)
where
EPostt(a) =
Z 1
0
eaPostt(ea)dea
so that only the posterior mean matters for equilibrium prices. As should
be clear from the results in this section, this shortcut can strongly alter
the asset pricing implications.27
7 Relation to the Literature
The concept of an Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium (IREE)
developed in this paper is a generalization of the Bayesian REE con-
cept. The latter emerges as a special case of IREE when agents pos-
sess su¢ cient knowledge about the market so that they can deduce the
equilibrium market outcome associated with any possible sequence of
fundamentals.
The IREE is also related to the private information REE analyzed
in Allen, Morris and Shin (2006). Both equilibrium concepts relax the
common knowledge assumptions of standard models, in the case of Allen,
Morris and Shin due to the assumption of private information, in our
case due to the assumption of imperfect market knowledge. Also, it
appears relatively straightforward to extend the IREE presented in the
present paper so as to incorporate private information. This extension
would cause private information REE to be a special case of private
information IREE.
The relationship between IREE and Arrow-Debreu equilibrium has
been discussed in section 3.4 before. The absence of Arrow securities
in our model appears to be an important ingredient giving rise to the
possibility that IREE outcomes can di¤er from the Arrow-Debreu equi-
librium outcomes. It seems worthwhile investigating this issue in greater
detail in future research.
Our work is also related to a number of papers in the learning liter-
ature that attempt to construct a full set of beliefs over long-horizons,
see important work by Preston (2005) and Eusepi and Preston (2010).
The main di¤erence is that our agentsbeliefs take the form of a well
27Similarly, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) assume a nite asset price after some xed
terminal date T <1. Sensitivity then arises with respect to the chosen date T .
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dened probability measure over a stochastic process while these papers
use the anticipated utility framework of Kreps (1998). As a consequence,
agents in these models construct each period a new probability measure,
but one that is almost surely inconsistent with the measure held in the
previous period.
The setup in this paper is also indirectly related to the literature
on rational beliefs initiated by Mordecai Kurz (1997). In rational be-
liefs models agentsprobability densities are assumed to be shifting in
response to the realization of an extrinsic generating sequence. In our
model belief revisions are triggered by model intrinsic factors, i.e., mar-
ket outcomes and fundamentals. Moreover, in rational belief models,
agents entertain a standard probability space over fundamentals. Thus,
unlike in the present setup, agentsjoint beliefs about prices and divi-
dends incorporates a singularity.
The IREE is also related to the model-consistent equilibrium concept
of Anderson and Sonnenschein (1985) who assume that agents have a
parameterized econometric model that denes a probability density over
prices. Anderson and Sonnenschein, however, impose a kind of rational
expectations structure on the beliefs of agents: within the class of models
considered, agents are assumed to employ the parameter values that best
t the actual outcome of the data. Thus, unlike in our setting there is
no learning from market outcomes because agents are assumed to know
the best tting model from the start.
The paper is also related to recent work on self-conrming equilib-
rium (SCE), see Fudenberg and Levine (1993), Sargent (1999), and Cho
and Sargent (2008). A SCE is a stationary equilibrium in which agents
know the objective probability distributions as they emerge in equilib-
rium, although agents may entertain wrong beliefs about what would
happen o¤ the equilibrium path.28 I an SCE agentsjoint beliefs over
fundamentals and market outcomes thus features a singularity, as in the
case with rational expectations. The singularity again reects the fact
that agents have perfect knowledge about equilibrium market behavior,
possibly because they can observe an innite history of past equilib-
rium outcomes and have learned to optimally condition on the past.
This contrasts with the situation described in an IREE, where agents
are uncertain about equilibrium market behavior and their beliefs do
not contain a singularity, possibly because they do not observe innite
amounts of past (stationary equilibrium) market outcomes. An IREE
can nevertheless converge asymptotically to a SCE or an REE, as is ac-
tually the case in our example in section 5. And to avoid situations in
28This generates gaps between REE and SCE, as a REE is a SCE but not vice
versa.
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which agents have innite amounts of past data available but still fore-
cast suboptimally, our denition of an IREE in section 3.4 could have
added the following requirement: if an IREE converges to a stationary
outcome, then this outcome must be an SCE or REE. The di¢ culty
with this and similar restrictions on asymptotic rationality is that they
have no implication for any nite amounts of data, i.e., no empirically
testable hypotheses arise from such asymptotic requirements on forecast
optimality. And requiring full optimality of beliefs along the convergence
process leads one back to the concept of a Bayesian REE. In the light of
this discussion, the development of a general metric allowing to quantify
intermediate degrees of forecast rationality over a convergence process
appears to be an important task for future research.
8 Conclusions
We formulate a model with internally rational agents that fail to be ex-
ternally rational because they possess limited knowledge about the mar-
ket. Lack of market knowledge naturally gives rise to learning from mar-
ket outcomes, so that expectations regarding the future market outcomes
become an important determinant of the current market outcome, inde-
pendently from agentsexpectations about fundamentals. Since market
outcomes feed back into agents beliefs, imperfect market knowledge can
give rise to additional propagation in economic models.
The present paper shows - perhaps surprisingly - that some of the
modeling choices in the adaptive learning literature, e.g., the use of one-
step-ahead Euler equations, are less ad-hoc than might initially appear.
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010) show that this generalizes to a setting
with risk averse agents, provided stock market wealth is a negligible
part of agentstotal wealth. Yet, in the more appealing case with non-
negligible stock market wealth this ceases to be true. Long horizon
asset price forecasts then matter for current equilibrium prices, as shown
in Adam and Marcet (2010). This is so because future prices a¤ect
future consumption abilities and agents dislike consumption volatility
when they are risk averse. The microfoundations of the model are thus
informative about which beliefs matter for the equilibrium outcomes in
models of learning.
We believe that internal rationality is an interesting approach to
describe agent behavior in models of learning. It gives rise to models of
learning that are fully consistent with optimizing behavior and provides a
rationale for equilibrium equations with very di¤erent implications than
those emerging from the standard REE approach. We expect the concept
of internal rationality to have a wide range of fruitful applications in
many eld of economics dealing with dynamic decision making.
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A Appendix
A.1 Existence of a Maximum
Strictly speaking one has to guarantee existence of a maximum before
the rst order conditions (8) can be used. With arbitrary price beliefs
and risk neutrality existence of a maximum is in question, since an agent
that assigns positive probability to prices growing at a rate larger than
 1 achieves innite utility. We outline below how to modify slightly the
agentsutility in a way that existence is guaranteed and that the pricing
implications of the model are virtually unchanged. We only consider
beliefs P such that P;D > 0 almost surely.
Consider the family of utility functions that is indexed by a nite
constant C
UC(C
i
t) =

Cit C
i
t  C
C + g(Cit   C) Cit > C
where g is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, di¤erentiable and bounded
function satisfying g(0) = 0, g0(0) = 1 and g ()  g. We have UC = 1
for C < C but UC < 1 for C  C.
The consumers problem can be rewritten as a function only of the
choice for contingent stock holding plans S = fS0; S1; :::g with St : 
t !
[0; S]: Since for any given C the objective function is bounded and since
the action space S is compact, an expected utility maximizing plan does
exist. We now show that for any nite number of periods T < 1, the
rst order conditions with this bounded utility function are arbitrarily
close to those used in the main text as C ! 1: Hence, the pricing
implications are arbitrarily close to those in the main text.
Actual consumption Cit in equilibrium is bounded by the available
dividends Dt. Thus, for any T < 1 the probability that

Dt  C
	T
t=0
in equilibrium is close to one when C is su¢ ciently high. Therefore,
with arbitrarily high probability the agents rst order conditions in
t = 1; :::; T are given by
Pt = 
iEP
i
t

U 0
C
(Cit+1) (Pt+1 +Dt+1)

and Sit 2

0; S

(32)
plus the slackness conditions for Sit = S or S
i
t = 0: From Lebesgues
Dominated Convergence Theorem
lim
C!1
EP
i
t

U 0
C
(Cit+1) (Pt+1 +Dt+1)

= EP
i
t [(Pt+1 +Dt+1)] (33)
This implies that for C !1 the rst order conditions (32)) approximate
with arbitrary precision the rst order conditions (8) used in the main
text.
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A.2 Approximation of Beliefs
We prove (26), denotes an equality correct up to rst order.
EPt

elog 
P
elog "
P
t+1

EPt
 
1 + log P + log "Pt+1

= 1 + log Pt
=1 +
1
t+ 0
tX
j=1
log
Pj
Pj 1
+
0
t+ 0
ln P0
 1
t+ 0
tX
j=1
Pj
Pj 1
+
0
t+ 0
P0 =
bPt
the rst line approximates log P and log "Pt+1 around log 
P = log "Pt+1 =
0, uses EPt log "
P
t+1 = 0 and that E
P
t

log P

= log Pt ;
29 the second line
uses the update rule (25a); the third line approximates Pj=Pj 1 and 
P
0
around Pj=Pj 1 = 1 and log 
P = 0.
A.3 Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1:. Fix t and Dt. For any realization !D 2 
D
for which the rst t elements are given by Dt, the law of motion for
dividends for all j  1 implies
Dt+j(!D) = a(!D)
j
jY
=1
t+ (!D) Dt
so that the partial discounted sum can be expressed as
TX
j=1
j Dt+j(!D) =
TX
j=1
ja(!D)
j
TY
=1
t+ (!D) Dt (34)
To prove the rst part of the proposition notice
EP
 
lim
T!1
TX
j=1
j Dt+j(!D)
Dt
!
 EP
 
TX
j=1
j Dt+j(!D)
Dt
!
=EP
 
TX
j=1
ja(!D)
j
jY
=1
t+ (!D) Dt
Dt
!
= Dt
Z 1
0
 
TX
j=1
j (ea)j! Postt(ea) dea(35)
 Dt
Z 1
 1
 
TX
j=1
j (ea)j! Postt(ea) dea  Dt  T  Z 1
 1
Postt(ea) dea =1
29This follows from the fact that the marginal posterior for

log P ; log D
0
is
Student t-distributed, location vector

log Pt ; log 
D
t
0
. See chapter 9.11 in DeGroot
(1970).
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where the rst inequality uses the fact Dt  0, the rst equality the
expression (34), the next equality the independence of future s from
Dt and a; the next inequality uses the fact that dividends are positive and
the second the fact that ea  1 over the considered range of integration.
The last equality uses that since part of the support is higher than  1
implies
R1
 1 Postt(ea)dea > 0.
To prove the second part of the proposition, given t; dene the func-
tion
F(!D) =
1X
j=1
jBj
jY
=1
t+ (!D) Dt
By standard arguments, the innite sum on the right side exists almost
surely and is nite. Therefore, F is well dened for almost all !D and
is integrable since EP (F(!D)jDt) = B1 BDt < 1: Moreover, for all T
and for given Dt
TX
j=1
j Dt+j(!D)  F(!D) a:s:
Therefore, the partial sums (34) are bounded a.s. by the integrable
function F , so that we can apply Lebesgues dominated convergence
theorem to obtain the rst equality below:
EP
 
lim
T!1
TX
j=1
jDt+j
Dt
!
= lim
T!1
EP
 
TX
j=1
j Dt+j
Dt
!
= Dt
Z 1
0
 
lim
T!1
TX
j=1
j (ea)j!Postt(ea) dea = DtEPostt  a1  a

The second equality follows from using (34) and taking expectations as
when deriving (35). This proves the second part of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2:. The proof is by construction. Let us rst
prove that P0 ! 1 for a sequence of priors when k ! 1: Given any
prior f with upper bound for the support B <  1 we can construct an
alternative sequence of priors
fk(a) =

(1  Bk B
k
)f(a) for a 2 [0; B]
1
k
for a 2]B;Bk]
where Bk = maxfB;  1(1  1
k
)g:
The density fk distributes probability mass 1
k
uniformly on the in-
terval ]B;Bk]; here Bk is the upper bound for the support of fk and we
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have limk!1Bk = 
 1. As required this sequence of alternative priors
satises
R fk   f ! 0 as k !1 becauseZ fk   f  = Z B
0
Bk  Bk f
+ Z Bk
B
1
k
= 2
Bk  B
k
< 2
 1  B
k
Moreover, it follows from part 1 of proposition 1 and simple derivations
that
P0 = E
Pk
0
 1X
j=1
jDj
!
= D0Efk

a
1  a

 D0
Z Bk
B
ea
1  eafk(ea) dea  D0Bk
Z Bk
B
1
1  ea dea
Using the change of variables x = 1  ea the integral in the last line can
be expressed asZ Bk
B
1
1  ea dea =
Z 1 B
1 Bk
1
x
dx =
1
(1  Bk)2  
1
(1  B)2
and we have
lim
k!1
B
k
Z Bk
B
1
1  ea dea = limk!1 Bk

k2   1
(1  B)2

=1
which establishes the claim for P0:
For Pt; all that changes is that the posterior for each fk is scaled
by the likelihood of the observed realization according to the model at
hand. As long as the likelihood puts positive weight on all parameter
values below  1 the derivations above work in the same way.
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